Well, the markets have taken a pretty bad beating during the last two days, very similar to 2007. The governments have finally discovered that simply saying “You need to grow up!” has about the same effect on children and on the economy: none (or, if lucky, 0.6%-ish). So instead of economic growth, there is government debt (which came from the bank bailouts…), unemployment and ‘age of austerity’. Which means that the fun is over: let’s face it (Western) world, WE DON’T KNOW WHAT TO DO (kind of like in the 1970s…remember stagflation?), so we are back at essentially competitive devaluations as much as possible, even though we know where this leads. And now, for some more qualified observers: 

“It’s not just that the threat of a double-dip recession has become very real. It’s now impossible to deny the obvious, which is that we are not now and have never been on the road to recovery.”

“And why should we be surprised at this catastrophe? Where was growth supposed to come from? Consumers, still burdened by the debt that they ran up during the housing bubble, aren’t ready to spend. Businesses see no reason to expand given the lack of consumer demand. And thanks to that deficit obsession, government, which could and should be supporting the economy in its time of need, has been pulling back.”

“Those plunging interest rates and stock prices say that the markets aren’t worried about either U.S. solvency or inflation. They’re worried about U.S. lack of growth.”

Paul Krugman (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/opinion/the-wrong-worries.html?_r=1)

“Yesterday’s fall in the US wiped out all of the stock price gains that American investors have enjoyed this year - that’s $700bn in savings and investments in US equities, wiped out in a single day.”

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14417210)

“In that sense, it is fair to argue that the recent increases in the public-sector indebtedness of many developed economies is the consequence in large part of the decisions taken in 2007 and 2008 not to let the banks and the financial system collapse.

Arguably the deleveraging of the banks, the shrinkage in their balance sheets, has been transferred to the state.

The overall volume of indebtedness in the economy is therefore still with us - although it has been shuffled from financial sector to public sector.”

“But also, just like the awakening in 2007 to the idea that many of the housing loans and associated financial products were worthless, so there is a growing fear that a number of financially overstretched governments, especially in the eurozone, will not be able to repay their debts in full.”

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14416959)

From the twittosphere:

“ Well that was quite a week - thinking the bottom would fall out if deal not reached in time *deal reached and *bottom falls 2 days later.” (http://twitter.com/#!/sjgallant)

“#Bernanke out of bullets. #Europe out of money. #Obama out of support. #Congress out of guts. #China out of patience. #Economy out of luck.” (http://twitter.com/#!/dkberman)

Goodnight, and goodluck!

While we have heard and talked at length about the state of Greek finances (and credit agencies, and the ECB, and Angela Merkel…), we have gradually started to employ the adjective “Greek” in a new way. Suddenly, “Greek” stands for several ‘new’ things: lack of fiscal discipline, unrealistic social demands, extreme political crisis, powerful trade unions, anarchism and youth revolts, etc. In some cases, “Greek” can come close to “lazy but pretentious”. I’m no particular specialist on the economic aspect of the Greek financial crisis (I will leave this to Jean Claude Trichet, the new Greek finance minister, and Superman), but the whole case offers two interesting observations for public diplomacy geeks such as your humble blogger, and for nation branding in particular. 

The first one is about the influence of the economy on the nation brand. The brand, being a holistic impression (heuristical by definition), obviously includes politics, society, economy, culture, history, personal experiences, etc. - so it’s no big surprise the economy plays a role (aside: Joseph Nye speaks of the role of the economy for the soft power of a given country, even though economic power on its own is a form of hard power of sticks and carrots). What is particular in this case is how the economy came to the forefront of the brand due to heavy media presence, followed closely by the strikes. The negative associations quickly overcame all of the positive aspects of the brand, sustained for decades, which focused on Greece’s cultural heritage as a tool for attracting tourists and which was reinforced by the Athens Olympics. This might lead to the not-so-original conclusion that a nation brand is hard to establish, but easy to shatter. 

The second observation is a reversed mirror version of the first: the influence of the brand on the economy has now received a striking illustration. Of course, I’m far from suggesting that the image of Greece is responsible for unsustainable sky-rocketing yields on its long term bonds - the budget deficit, the shaky bank system, the austerity measures, the large scale strikes and especially the amount of public debt certainly play a role. However, I would argue it does play a role in the downward spiral of Greece’s credit rating as investors now have to justify acquisitions in Greece very carefully because the brand Greece (similar to the country of origin effect) is almost synonymous to risk. 

A P.S. from the cultural anthropologist in me: I cannot help but notice how not so subtly the cartoons exploit ancient Greek mythology to illustrate the problems of Greece today. A favourite parallel is between the ancient Greek ruins and captions such as “The effect of the financial crisis” or “Greece’s economy” ; or with Greek statues. You can see some good cartoons here. This mix up of the “classic” Greek brand and the “new” Greek brand is an interesting combination, which to me indicates some pity for the current situation of this once (long ago) great country.

P.P.S. from my philosophy geek: I have a suspicion Nietzsche might be a bit disheartened by this treatment of a Greek…tragedy. By the way, I haven’t seen any jokes with Greek philosophy - perhaps it is hard to make fun in this context of the author of such phrases as “Money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.” (on this occasion, Aristotle)

…и “Атака” е отновно в центъра на общественото внимание със своите провокации. В същото време всичко е изключително шаблонно - и действията на Сидеров, и (без)действията на прокуратурата, и отговорът на обществото. Всъщност последното ще го видим на президентските избори, а засега имаме отговор само от някои елити (политически, медийни). Но Сидеров с “Атака” ни връща към класически проблеми на либерализма и демокрацията за свободата на словото и толерантността към нетолерантните. Като всяка националистична партия те не приемат тези ценности към “онези, другите”, но ги изтъкват в своя защита с неизказаният аргумент, че те важат за тях, защото те са “наш’те” и “ни” защитават. Ето един парадокс още от името - винаги съм се питал защо “Атака”? Националистическите партии са в крайната част на десния спектър (не говорим за екстремистите) именно защото за тях съществува една ясна, конкретна и явна национална идентичност, по-голяма от всеки индивид, която те са готови да защитават със средства, които често се движат по ръба на закона. Но това е и парадокса - те защитават една ултраконсервативна, изчистена национална утопия (затова често са и за силна намеса на държавата с цел регулация на заплахите за тази идентичност, включително и пазарната глобализация, което функционално ги доближава до крайно леви формации). Техните имена са “Национален фронт” във Франция, “Британска национална партия” в Англия - т.е. акцентират националното, а често и защитата му - “Английската лига за защита” например. А в България? “Атака”. И се питам какво атакува - различните ли, властта ли…Т.е. това е една “националистическа” партия, която не защитава ценности или идентичност, а атакува нещо. Партия насочена навън, с агресивно поведение диктувано от една криворазбрана идея за национализъм, който е изравнен с атаки, нападение, агресия, действия, които по своята дефиниция са насочени срещо нещо или някой. Крайъгълният камък за легитимността на тази формация е, че те се виждат като “атакуващи” от името на нещо по-голямо от индивида, а именно - от името на тази въображаема общност, нацията, която те си представят по някакъв определен начин. Е, аз не си представям България по техния начин, но за тях това няма значение - има само “ние” и “те”…ако не си от “нас”, значи си предател, значи си от “тях”. Кои тях? “Не-българите”. Предполагам, че горната логика е позната на всеки, който е водил спорове с някого, който се представя като “националист”. 

Всъщност обаче аз не бих могъл да потисна политологът в мен и се изкушавам от това да направя едно сравнение с друга европейска страна, която познавам добре - Франция. Не бих могъл да опиша изцяло феноменът “Национален фронт” на Льо Пен (преди с бащата Жан Мари, сега - дъщерята Марин) само в няколко изречения. Все пак, това е крайно дясна партия, която винаги се движи по ръба на демократичните ценности и си е изградила репутация на яростен критик на имиграцията и чужденците, но донякъде и на световния пазар и глобализацията. Никога не е била част от правителството въпреки че съществува от 70-те години (донякъде и в следствие на изборната система във Франция), което й позволява да бъде срещу всички администрации, леви и десни. Основният й електорат са мъже на средна и малко над средна възраст, работещи в индустрията, както и безработните - следователно не е учудващо, че партията се опитва “да говори пряко и истински”, да се идентифицира с “обикновения човек” и да атакува всички “елити”, които не го “разбират”. Между “Национален фронт” и “Атака” има разбира се прилики и разлики. Например: двете партии са силно зависими от симпатиите към лидерът им (не особено изненадващо за формации с ясно изразен вкус към авторитетни структури); двете използват дискурс насочен срещу чужденците с цел да спечелят симпатиите на “нашенците” - разделяй и владей; двете нямат сериозни изборни успехи макар да имат не малко симпатизанти - 15-20% от населението; двете се опитват да се легитимизират говорейки “директно” за “истината”. Разликите разбира се са огромни - в политическия пейзаж: петата френска република е доминирана от десните сили и няма партия еквивалентна на ДПС; в историята: “Национален фронт” си е изградил своята база за четири деситилетия; в групите, който са идентифицирани като “чужди” (често мюсюлмани): в единия случай това са имигранти, които идват да “откраднат” нашите работни места, в другия - българи, които по един или друг показател се разминават със стереотипа на “чистия” българин. Това, което обаче е най-интересно обаче е, че във Франция постепенно се е провела една “лепенизация” (по името на лидера на “Национален фронт”) на политиката, т.е. неговото присъствие макар и извън властта е толкова силно, че класическите теми на партията са станали част от нормално приетия обществен дискурс. По такъв начин партията печели и предимство - разбира се, че за нея е много по-добре да се говори за имиграцията като “проблем” отколкото за решаването на финансовата криза. Точно това като че ли се случва и в България като резултат от провокациите на “Атака” - говорим за “етническия мир”, отношенията между ДПС и “Атака”, джамиите в София. Икономическата политика, развитието на изостаналите райони от страната, подобряването на образованието, външната ни политика - теми с голяма тежест, но малък потенциал за вдигане на рейтинга на “Атака”, се оказват забравени. Вместо това, кметът на София щял да помоли джамията да намали с няколко децибела звука от тонколоните си…

Вместо заключение предлага следния цитат от Орхан Памук, неволен свидетел на мелето пред джамията миналата седмица: “Когато започнеш да се идентифицираш с някого, който е различен от теб, който дори е от съвсем друга култура от твоята, започваш да разбираш нещо. Разбирането е основата на толерантността.” 

Coming back to the most significant international topic of the last few days, Tunisia, the question now is of course “Who’s next?”. However, before offering my view, I would like to bring to your attention several interesting points. In my previous post on the topic, I touched upon the influence of Wikileaks and Foreign Policy have quickly seized on this. Otherwise, the two analysis which seemed most pertinent to me came from Foreign Policy (yes, again) and Liberation. In an intriguing article, Koplow puts forward the thesis that the absence of Islamist intervetion is directly related to the fall of Ben Ali. Indeed, Ben Ali and Bouguiba before him had a very secular conception of the state, initiated and carried out a crackdown on Islamist factions and never even turned around to use Islamist symbols as means of legitimizing their power. Indeed, it is possible that if Islamist factors were directly involved in the unrest, the response would have been much harder from the military (which had an otherwise thorny relationship with Ben Ali), which may have then perceived them as an existential threat (mind you, Islamists did offer to help the people oppressed by an unjust dictator, but they simply weren’t needed). Second article worth mentioning is the interview in the Liberation with Gilles Kepel (in French), where he offers a sociological analysis. According to him, the middle class was the catalyst and the main actor in the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. Thus (corresponding to the J-curve analysis) a secularised, well-educated middle class which was also relatively well off in comparison to the region, was moved to action by a powerful symbol of protest - the immolation of an unemployed graduate. He rightfully points out that unrest in other countries - mainly Jordan and Egypt, but also Syria and Algeria - represents a challenge to the middle and upper classes by the most disillusioned segments of society such as unemployed youth. 

I fully subscribe to the ideas presented by Koplow and Kepel, and I remain relatively cautious about the prospects of an immediate spill-over effect. What Tunisia has achieved is remarkable in its own right - and it has inspired others. However, this is by its very nature a nationalistic rather than a pan-Arab or pan-Muslim movement - so it would be naive to expect Tunisia to try to “export the revolution” as in the case of Iran for example. Another parallel often evoked is of course with the fall of the Berlin wall - both in terms of speed and in terms of taking (almost) everyone by surprise. Whether Tunisia is the beginning of a Fourth Wave of democratisation remains to be seen, but in any case this will not be the same process as in Eastern Europe where the relaxed grip of the leading state in the bloc (first in announcing that the USSR will not intervene militarily, later in declaring the the USSR is not interested in competing with the US) led to a process of unwinding of the political status quo - we can hardly think of the Arab world as a centrally run hierarchical bloc and even less of Tunisia as the leading country in it. What the Tunisian revolution has also showed is that neither Islam nor Arabs are opposed to democracy and freedom by their “nature” or by something else - a powerful lesson for some right-wing essentialists (hint hint - Huntington). Everything above is of course subject to confirmation - the interim government has first to stop the country from descending into anarchy (this state of nature seems to vindicate Hobbes), then to organise successful elections, and after then to establish a democracy which could provide for the people - but all the indispensable foundations, most importantly popular desire for democracy and an active middle class which can play the role of civil society - are there. 

Nevertheless,  I still don’t see how this can rapidly become a spill-over. Yes, we have just seen popular uprising in the Middle East with no outside intervention (if we are to dismiss the extremely inadequate handling of the crisis by Marie-Alliot, French Foreign Minister, who fist offered French police expertise in trying to deal with the ‘security situation’ and then sent a short statement that France has “taken not” of recent developments when even the US diplomacy reacted quickly within hours; that said, France’s situation was admittedly tricky since any attempt to speak out would have been seen as an intervention by a former colonial power…but Sarkozy was quite vocal over Iran as far as I can remember…). The question of outside intervention is crucial - as FP (if I recall correctly) argued, with Tunisia the US could sit back and watch the developing situation; however, an uprising in Egypt will require a reaction - and could well turn out to be a make-or-break event such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution was for Jimmy Carter. 

I also stand by my view that the underlying current to the tensions in the region is the food crisis, which is interrelated with the demographic and environmental problems; and honestly, the crisis is probably here to stay - it’s the main item on G20’s agenda along with China’s currency. Therefore, it would be interesting to keep an eye on how this develops.

Overall then I can see a number of factors which prevent an immediate spill-over effect. Nevertheless, the potential is there - and this will probably be one of the major events of 2011.

The recent unrest in Tunisia and Algeria is quite worrying, but I cannot resist to point to what political science has to say on the topic. One of the many theories trying to grapple with the issue of revolutions (and thus trying to predict where and when they arise), is the “J-curve” theory by James Davies. In resume, we can see that according to this theory revolutions come in the wake of sudden reversions of otherwise long-term and stable upwards trends. Thus, while people’s expectations continue to grow, the stagnation and even degradation in the situation (economic, political, social…) opens up a gap between reality and expectations. There comes a stage when the difference between the projection of expectations and the reality on the ground becomes unacceptable and social movements erupt, possibly leaving to a revolution - when the difference becomes unacceptable is obviously the million-dollar question here. However, we might see that the 2008 crash did not lead to revolutions mainly because we started to think immediately about the ‘recovery’. Indeed, now that the prospect of a jobless and sluggish recovery in the developed world with unemployment rate stubbornly high at 10-ish % and not looking like they are going to be reduced meaningfully even when profits are picking up again has turned into reality, and also when the costs of the bailout of the banks ‘too big to fail’ has finally trickled through the government to the people in terms of a mix of higher taxes, reduced benefits and deficit-slashing, we are seeing much more anger and challenges to the ‘system’ since the ‘bright future’ is somehow lost from the horizon of our actions and a dumb and painful everyday struggle becomes a reality.

However, if we return to Tunisia we could probably observe the same logic - for people there no change for the better seems likely and it has driven an unemployed graduate to kill himself in protest, which indeed unleashed the wave of protests, which spilled over in Algeria. Up until recently,Tunisia was in fact one of the more successful countries in the region. Of course, behind this particular case, we can find the same logic as behind previous food riots - the dynamics of the food crisis. A fluctuation of 1% in the the price of basic food products puts 16 million people into a situation of malnutrition (even a decrease has the same effect, as it pushes small agricultural producers which receive a meagre income into poverty). There are plenty of reasons for these food crises - increased demand (increased consumption of meat and fish in China and India and generally in the developing world; increased population - from 3 billions in the 1940s to 6.5 billion today and probably around 9 billion in 2050; increasing urbanisation and therefore consumption) and decreased supply (due to climate change and erosion due to abuse of pesticides and GMOs; the importance of the agrocarburants, which put food and energy in direct competition; and decrease of agricultural land due to the above-mentioned urbanisation); the politics of the WTO, hostile to any support from developing states to small farmers; increased costs of energy which is required for transportation, transformation and conservation; but crucially - speculators who make a profit on a fairly unregulated market. In Tunisia’s case, this is the reality, toppled with an authoritarian political system - since independence, it has only had two presidents (Bourguiba from 1956 until 1987, when in his 90s he was declared senile; and the current leader - Ben Ali). The same regime also promises the creation of some 300 000 jobs in the next 2 years - a very unreasonable estimate given current growth estimates. In a move taken out from Machiavelli’s “The Prince” (the episode between Borgia and D’Orco), the Interior Minister has been asked to use violence to repress the riots and then sacked as a scapegoat for having used too much violence. Finally, there is also the demographic factor - 55% of the population is under 25, but this is still under the standard for Africa (you could see this map in French about the percentage of population of countries under 15 years). 

Another interesting aspect is that apparently Wikileaks disclosures have played a role in provoking the anger of Tunisian youth - which begs the question whether the Tunisian regime is not a collateral victim to the US Diplomatic establishment targeted by Assange? However, people seem here to trust the information in the cables, which a bit paradoxically proves again that the Cablegate scandal revealed a diplomacy which was working fairly well and which corresponded fairly closely to what it was perceived to be from the outside (by careful observers at least). 

There are also some interesting articles today:

…on the politics behind the ICC and the attempt of Kenya to organise a African-wide walkout;

…on one of the few positive things to note on the anniversary of the Haiti quake - CSR and investment by telecom companies;

…executive summary of the diplomatic review ordered by Sec. of State Hillary Clinton; 

Wikileaks is getting annoying - so annoying as to actually make me sit down and write a note. No, let me rephrase that - it is the debate around Wikileaks which is annoying, overhyped, and (mostly) misses the interesting points. Please, please, pretty please notice the choice of words - ‘interesting’ - because, simply put, there is nothing ‘important’ in the latest release. In substance, the only disclosure which surprises is that State Dept., and Clinton herself, have instructed diplomats to involve in certain…let’s say intelligence gathering activities in the UN which blur the line with spying. 

Now, this does not mean Wikileaks does not have an effect - Clinton is certainly going to have a fun time in Kazakhstan where she will meet, among others, Medvedev and Merkel. It also has some marginal positive effects on the Israeli-Palestine talks since it reassures Israel that Arab countries are equally worried about Iran; it even has some minor repercussions in Bulgaria. However, as we get past the character bashing (which is undoubtedly present in the cables of other countries…) and the obvious consequences for US diplomacy (it suggests that dealing with American officials might be quite a pain as not only talks might go public relatively soonish, but also because diplomats might turn out to be spies), we can note some items of interest.

First of all, let’s start with Wikileaks itself. A website, which received numerous awards when disclosing single-issue documents (Guantanamo procedures, BNP membership list, Sarah Palin’s e-mail account O.o; but most notably the CRU e-mails which partly derailed negotiations in Copenhagen), Wikileaks really came to the front of media attention with the publication of the infamous American helicopter video. In these 3-4 years before becoming a household (if you are a diplomacy nerd that is) topic, the site managed to achieve critical mass - that is, to build up credibility and trust by protecting its sources and by establishing itself as a prime whistleblower site. From then on it could build on this platform, and that is exactly what it did in 2010 with the documents from Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Interestingly enough, these documents represented a change of strategy - they were accumulated and then released at once for the biggest media impact rather than making just a few headlines by one-off controversial releases. Wikileaks also seems to learn quite fast - it just threw out there the Afghan documents, but it worked closely with chosen media to create a bigger impact for its Iraq documents. The release of the cables is yet another development in this learning process - this time, to avoid criticism of endangering human lives, it first discussed the documents with the State Department before publishing; it also releases them not all at once, but gradually for a longer impact. This necessarily focused more and more attention on the organization itself and its leader, Assange (including quite some problems for him). 

As an aside, however, I would suggest it is interesting to muse a little bit over the name of the organization. ‘Leaks’ - pretty obvious, but why ‘Wiki’? Why not some grand name such as “The League for Disclosure of Information of Public Interest”? There are numerous reasons. First, a longer name is not only harder to attract attention, but also implies a normative statement which is only explicit in the current name. Second, ‘Wiki’ without a doubt is a reference to ‘Wikipedia’ - but the project is in no way associated (indeed, Wikipedia precises that Wikileaks is “Not to be confused with wiki websites such as Wikipedia”). Therefore, the reference is to free exchange of information, the desire to co-create knowledge, and the conviction that more education is the key to a better world - a number of norms which have established themselves, notably on (and thanks to) the internet. 

Second, let’s consider for a while a crucial fact - Wikileaks is a part not of a two-level game with the government (essentially the US one - by virtue of holding it accountable to its self-professed ideals), but a three-level game, including the media. Indeed, the media’s attitude is also evolving - some media completely refused to report the news, while others ran an editorial explaining why they are publishing selected cables (ex. the International Herald Tribune). There is a crucial point to grasp - Wikileaks is essentially an NGO, which needs the media; while the media needs the information which this NGO might possess. This has implications for both sides. From Wikileaks’ perspective this require adaptation and building up a network of contacts as well as a name for itself (notice how now it can announce the ‘future’ release of other documents and dictate the agenda in this way). From the media side, this represents a marked shift from journalist investigations (Iran-Contra, Watergate), where doubts in the integrity of the government prompts it to conduct research, to a situation whether they are dependent on an external, non-official, non-accountable and potentially irresponsible source. 

Third, it is time to turn to the reactions of different states. In a sharp illustration of how slow governments ‘learn’, most (except Germany, Iran who have refused to comment on the information, sending a signal that it is not important to them) have reflexively accused Wikileaks again of threatening the national interest (read: security) and endangering human lives. However, the latest release calls their bluff - there are hardly any obvious ways in which internal communication is implicating human lives - a potent accusation with the previous two releases, which Wikileaks very quickly ‘learned’ to counter. What the Wikileaks-phenomenon actually represents is that governments are no longer in control of the international agenda and that they have to react to events provoked by non-state actors (9/11 anyone?). 

However, the perspective from which the cable release is most interesting, is one of professional interest of an organizational culture. Perhaps the most significant aspect of these cables is that they remind us about the ‘human factor’ of international relations - indeed, diplomacy and world politics is carried out not by the US or China, but are constructed by human beings who act on behalf of imagined communities and territorially organized political entities (for those of you who are not political geeks - relations are carried out by humans, not states). These cables also reveal how effective and successful the US diplomatic establishment is - information is widely available (internally) on a ‘need to know’ basis rather than according to rank and diplomats attempt to demonstrate that they know both their ‘subject’ and their ‘counterpart’ or ‘negotiator’.

In the long term, one of the key legacies of Wikileaks might well be its challenge to state secrecy. Predominantly, documents released by Wikileaks since its creation have not told us something new which we did not already strongly suspect (as opposed to, for example, the revelations of the Pentagon Papers). Indeed, there is a public interest to know - and that public interest, to which Wikileaks is an institutionalised expression, is connected with a suspicion that the government is doing stuff which it does not want to tell to its people. That should seriously prompt the diplomatic institution to reconsider whether the culture of secrecy is not becoming a liability rather than an asset - and to consequently ‘network’, or open, more of its information. What is the purpose of automatically putting a “classified” status on a cable which is essentially a transcript of a public speech given by an ambassador? Albeit standard operating procedures are in dire need of reform, this does not mean everything should be public - and I doubt that even the public itself wants to see it public. Indeed, we can look at police proceedings where people clearly recognize the need to keep certain information confidential. Therefore, it is not the problem that the public wants to know everything, including information related to national security; the problem is that the government cannot explain why it is keeping all the information it is keeping now as secret, which undermines trust and credibility. Indeed, the current situation is even more dangerous - opening up more of its activities will put it every once in a while in an awkward position; keeping everything secret means that the doubts of the general public might provoke the next Bradley Manning to inadvertently (or not) disclose some information which is indeed closely related to human lives. Therefore, current government accusations sound, to put it mildly and diplomatically, exaggerated and even counterproductive. 

Another aspect closely related to Wikileaks is the use of the internet. Indeed, these leaks are illustrative in demonstrating what medium theory has always argued - that while the information medium does not create new meaning by itself, it facilitates certain behaviours and put obstacles to others. Thus, without the internet it would physically impossible to first download all this information on a single USB stick (you would probably need several trucks), and then to disseminate it effectively. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that the documents were obtained not by cyberwarfare or by cyberespionage, but by an insider with legitimate access to them; therefore, this is not a breach of security (rather, we come back to the human factor). The internet also enabled Wikileaks to retain a certain amount of distance with media as it could get its message ‘out there’ without being completely dependent on media. However, before becoming too optimistic, we should note that a DoS attack was suffered by Wikileaks servers almost immediately after the release of the documents.

In conclusion, as is the habit with every little essay, I would like to evoke two points for the future. First, Wikileaks naturally begs the question of ‘quis custodiet ipsos custodes’, or ‘Who guards the guardians?’. Well, there is at least a simple answer to that - civil society can demand transparency from its own organisations. Thus, we have seen how some disillusioned members of Wikileaks (who itself faces the ‘human factor’) have left it and created an organisation to track Wikileaks itself (possibly allowing for leaks from its personnel). Second question, with a lot less obvious answer is - what happens if a government wants to use Wikileaks as a tool by “leaking” intentionally important information and then, after the impact, denying it in public? Indeed, the key test for Wikileaks will come when governments call its bluff - for now they’ve been shy to do that - and challenge its sources. So far, state representatives have said that the disclosed information is dangerous, which amounts to an implicit confirmation of its accuracy; however, how and if Wikileaks can deal with accusations of inaccuracy or fraud remains to be seen. 

Extreme right-wing parties seem to be on the rise in Europe these days (Sweden, Hungary, the ‘minaret ban’ in Switzerland, but also the revival of the Front National in France and the popularity enjoyed by BNP in some parts of Britain). One figure in particular has focused media attention lately - Geert Wilders. An opinion piece from Foreign Policy got me thinking on the issue. The article makes all usual points - how extreme parties are co-opted and arguably “mellowed” by their inclusion in the policy-making process; how these parties rely on causing controversy and outrage as a way to get media coverage; how they ‘steal’ left-wing rhetoric of high social welfare spending and combine it with a right-wing ‘tough’ stance on crime and punishment, etc. Increasingly, these parties also ‘hijack’ the issue of free speech and claim to be victimised by the media. 

The article however notes one key observation without really following it up - “The meteoric success of Wilders and his harsh anti-Islam rhetoric is perplexing in a stable, relatively well-off Western European country like the Netherlands.” So why is the extreme right on the rise in these countries? The Netherlands have long stood out as an example of tolerance and especially of religious tolerance; Switzerland has built its fortune by staying neutral on political and religious questions. 

In my opinion (and I’m no specialist on the extreme Right), the main issue here is identity. This is not a groundbreaking observation, but it is interesting to note how political entrepreneurs are using this issue at countries which have a history for tolerance and solid democratic culture and institutions. What I would like to point out mainly here is that in these countries Islam itself is not a major political or social force, which leads to two points. First, it is easy to target as Muslims themselves do not have a large bearing on the electoral system or public opinion; second, these countries are at a certain stage of globalisation in which Islam becomes more and more visible and therefore threatens their cultural identity. Interestingly, neither the Netherlands nor Switzerland is exactly historically an ethnically or religiously homogeneous, so there must be a new factor here - and for me it’s globalisation, mainly in its cultural form (that is, if you believe we can separate the forms of globalisation…). It is often said that globalisation acts as a centripetal force at global level (centralisation, regulation, organisation of the international system) but also as a centrifugal force at local level, that is, it strengthens the need for personal identification and differentiation (versus the Other) vis-a-vis an emerging mass homogeneity (or commodification…), often provided by the ‘local’ level - language, cinema, food…religion. This confluence of structural factors then creates the fertile ground exploited by the European extreme-right (aided in that by an economic crisis which radicalises opinions in the short term, but also weak Left and general dissatisfaction with politics, which some would say are features of post-modernism).

In conclusion, the confluence of factors such as globalisation, identity politics, and the convenient both politically and culturally target of the Other in the form of the Islam have helped the rise of the European extreme right. However, it is also part of the bigger issue of the insecurity of the modern individual in a post-modern world…and regressive political expressions of conflict which offer the false promise of this security.